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PROTECTING ARTISTIC PROPERTY
WITH THE
EQUITABLE SERVITUDE DOCTRINE*
TiOMAS W. BERTZ**
Law like nature abhors a vacuum. And if there be no law fostering
and protecting the business interests of a growing segment of indus-
try, the courts will readily adapt existing legal doctrines to meet the
commercial needs of an industrial innovation. This principle of law has
asserted itself repeatedly and the time may be ripe for it to assert
itself again. The vacuum, so to speak, is the void in the law caused
by the inadequate coverage of the Copyright Act; the filling force is
the resurgence of the doctrine of equitable servitudes as applied to
chattels.
Although the doctrine has existed for over a century, the employ-
ment of it to enforce restrictions placed upon personalty in the mer-
cantile world has been judicially restrained. The infrequent use of the
doctrine was caused by the courts' rejection of it as an enforceable
equitable device and by their past refusal to give full recognition to it.
Skepticism and disfavor which in the eyes of the courts surround
such servitudes have consequently caused the doctrine to be dormant,
if not forgotten. On one occasion it was discussed as being a basis for
upholding a restriction placed upon a copyrighted article;' yet this
attitude towards the doctrine was not uniformly shared by the courts
or their respective judges. And even today, the judicial feeling toward
the doctrine is mixed, both on the federal and state level.2 Recently,
however, the doctrine has been viewed in a new light which has caused
some stir in legal writing although no noticeable change has yet taken
place in the commercial world.3 The new impetus given the doctrine
together with the pattern of the latest decisions in this area point to
the possibility of a new trend. A renaissance of the doctrine accom-
panied by a general acceptance of it might be the events which will
form the desired legal protection against the piracy of intellectual and
artistic works which find no protection under the Copyright Act.4 The
* This article was the first place entry in the Nathan Burkan Competition at
Marquette University in 1961, conducted by the American Society of Com-
posers, Authors and Publishers.
** B.A., 1959, College of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minn.; LL.B., 1962, Marquette
University; presently clerk to Chief Justice Timothy Brown, Supreme Court,
State of Wisconsin.
'In re Waterman, Berlin & Snyder Co., 48 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1931).
2 Note the cases cited herein, federal and state, which illustrate the divergent
views in regard to the recognition of the equitable servitude doctrine.
3Nadell & Co. v. Grasso, 175 Adv. Cal. App. 449, 346 P.2d 505 (1959).
4 61 Stat. 652 (1947), Title 17, U.S.C. (1958).
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purpose of this article is to explore the possibility of upplementing
the Copyright Act with this equitable device.
DEFINING THE DOCTRINE
The recognition of the equitable servitude doctrine is dependent
upon the circumstances surrounding the case considered in the light
of public policy.5 Consequently, it is difficult to arrive at an accurate
definition of the doctrine. Despite this disadvantage in writing about
the doctrine, a workable definition of it will prove to be helpful in the
analysis of the doctrine and in the tracing of it through its historical
development. For the purposes of this article, the doctrine of equitable
servitudes is the basis for enforcing a servitude placed on chattels" in
equity upon the legal principle that the restriction runs with the chattel
for the benefit of the dominant tenement" at the expense of the servient
tenement. The dominant tenement is that legally recognized property
interest protected by a covenant against any invasion of the interest by
the contracting party or by a subsequent assignee of the rights of the
contract. Likewise, the servient tenement is that property interest which
suffers the burden of carrying the restriction of servitude.
The dominant tenement can assume various forms, but in each
case it must be a property interest which under the circumstances
warrants protection. On the other hand, the servient tenement is
always the particular chattel which carries the limitation. Even though
the servient tenement remains the same, there are two types of servi-
tudes that can be placed on it, affirmative and negative. As they sug-
gest, the affirmative servitude requires acts to be performed whereas
the negative servitude prohibits certain acts. Affirmative servitudes
depend mainly on the circumstances in which they are used. Conse-
quently, they are too numerous to classify. But negative servitudes
have been sorted into the following usual types: price maintenance
restrictions, territorial restrictions, resale restrictions, use restrictions
and tying restrictions."
Of particular interest is the determination of the dominant tene-
ment. Justice Lillie points out that even the good will of a business
is capable of being the dominant tenement since good will is legally
recognized as a property interest.9 Professor Chafee contends that the
5 18 B. U. L. Rmv. 441 (1938) ; 22 MINN. L. REv. 559 (1938) and Chafee, The
Music Goes Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HARV.
L. REV. 1250 (1956); cf., 22 COLUm. L. REv. 351 (1922) and 36 HAzv. L. Rzv.
107 (1922). Compare, Giddings, Land, Restrictions Upon the Use Of, S HAV.
L. R.y. 274 (1891-2) with note, 17 HARv. L. Ray. 415 (1904).
6 It must be noted that the doctrine also applies to realty.
7 For reasons against the dominant tenement theory, see Stone, The Equitable
Rights and Liabilities of Strangers to a Contract, 18 CoLusi. L. REV. 291, 309
(1918).
8 Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARv. L. Rxv. 945, 948 (1928).
9 Nadell & Co. v. Grasso, supra note 3, at 512.
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dominant tenement in a copyrighted or patented article is the copyright
or the patent interest itself.'0 His reasoning is cogent because a copy-
right is a property right.
When the subject matter of a restriction is a patented article
or copyrighted book, the case for enforcement against a sub-
purchaser is stronger than in the case of an ordinary chattel.
First, the fact that the plaintiff already has a monopoly may
render the courts less hostile to the restraint. Secondly, there is
now no difficulty in finding a dominant tenement for the servi-
tude, for this is supplied by the patent or copyright."
Consequently, determining the dominant tenement in copyrighted
articles presents little dfficulty. However, problems arise in defining
a property interest which can be considered a dominant tenement when
the artistic work does not fall within the coverage of the Act or com-
mon law copyright. In both situations, however, problems arise in
determining the public policy upon which to sustain the application of
the doctrine. Since the very basis for recognizing the doctrine is con-
sideration of public policy, this factor plays no little role. The two
opposing camps in considering public policy are the principle of the
free alienation and use of personalty and the principle of protecting a
certain property interest of the user of the servitudes. 2 An aid in
overcoming public policy which is against the recognition of the doc-
trine is a showing that the dominant tenement is a property interest
which should be afforded protection. An example of this procedure
is to prove that the dominant tenement is a property interest defined
and protected by the laws prohibiting "unfair competition." 13
Besides considerations of public policy and the determination of
the dominant and servient tenements notices must be given to subse-
quent assignees of the servitude on the chattel. Without notice of the
restriction at the time of the assignment, the assignee cannot be held
to comply with the limitation because failure to give notice will cause
the servitude to stop "running" with the article.
Since the equitable servitude doctrine is the basis for granting an
equitable remedy, the equitable principles of relief must be present,
namely, the remedy at law must be inadequate14 and the compliance
with restrictions must not cause any unreasonable hardship to the
defendant.
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE
An insight into the development of the equitable servitude doctrine
will give an indication of the direction in which it will grow. The
10 Chafee, supra note 8, at 998.
11 Ibid.
12 The conflict between the two theories is resolved by the balancing of the social
and pecuniary interests of the party litigants.
1aRESTATEMENT, TORTS, §711-61 (1938).
14 1 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §217 at 367 (5th ed. 1941).
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roots of the doctrine are imbedded in covenants concerning restrictions
placed on the use of real property. In Tulk v. Moxhay,15 a 19th century
English decision, the court enunciated the principle that the vendor in
the sale of land under certain circumstances could confine its use for
certain purposes. The unique part of the principle was that it could
be enforced against subsequent purchasers of the land who had know-
ledge of the use limitation at the time of their purchases. The reason for
upholding this restriction was that price inequities would result if
subsequent purchasers did not have to comply with use limitations.
Thus, the seed had been sown, and it was soon cultivated by the
courts until it had become an accepted part of real property law.
Ten years later the doctrine was applied to chattels. Lord Justice
Knight Bruce in De Mattos v. GibsoieG discussed this transition as
follows:
[W]here a man, by gift or purchase, acquires property from
another, with knowledge of a previous contract, lawfully and
for valuable consideration made by him with a third person,
to use and employ the property for a particular purpose in a
specified manner, the acquirer shall not, to the material damage
of the third person, in opposition to the contract and inconsis-
tently with it, use and employ the property in a manner not
allowable to the giver or seller. This rule, applicable alike in
general as I conceive to movable and immovable property.
[Emphasis supplied.]' 7
Restrictions placed upon patented articles were likewise held to
be valid. In one case, the plaintiff was a patentee and had granted
the patent by contract which required the grantee and his assignee to
pay a fixed percentage of the net profits to the plaintiff. The de-
fendant, an assignee, failed to make payments and was held liable
to account to the plaintiff for not complying with the original proviso.,
Later, patented articles were considered a unique type of chattel and
restrictions placed upon them were upheld without qualification. 9
Lord Hatherly expressed this attitude succinctly when he stated:
The sale of a patented article carries with it the right to use
it in any way that the purchaser choose to use it, unless he knows
of restrictions. Of course, if he knows of restrictions and they
are brought to his mind at the time of the sale, he is bound by
them. He is bound by them on this principle: The patentee
has sole right of using and selling the articles, and he may
prevent anybody from using them or dealing in them at all,
15 Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848).
16 De Mattos v. Gibson, 4 De G. & J. 276, 45 Eng. Rep. 108 (Ch. 1858).
17 Id. at 110.
18 Werderman v. Socit6 g~nrale d' lectricite, 19 Ch. D. 246 (1881).
'9 National Phonograph Co. v. Menck, [1911], A.C. 336, 350, where the court
quotes from Incandescent Gas Light Co. v. Cantelo, [1895] 12 R. Pat. Cas.
262.
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he has the right to do the lesser thing, that is to say, to impose
his own conditions. It does not matter how unreasonable or how
absurd the conditions are .... [Emphasis supplied.] 20
Although the court did not speak of the equitable servitude doc-
trine as such, it must be noted that if the doctrine had been used,
the result, the enforcement of a restriction upon chattels, would have
been the same.
Unlike patented articles, restrictions placed upon copyrighted ones
were not looked upon favorably by the English courts.2' In one case,
an author who had assigned the exclusive right to publish his book to
a publishing company was unable to hold a subsequent assignee liable
for royalty payments.
22
Transplanting the equitable servitude doctrine from real property
law to personal property law which had been successful earlier soon
met with obstacles. And then it was all but struck from the list of
enforceable equitable devices.
The classification of chattels into patented, copyrighted or common
set the pattern for the development of the doctrine in England. Thus,
the English courts scrutinized the particular kind of chattel involved
before upholding or rejecting a servitude placed on it. This approach
to the problem tends to cause confusion with respect to the applica-
tion of the doctrine. Since it depends upon the chattel involved, the
application of the doctrine is not only irregular, but it is difficult to
determine to what extent the doctrine itself is the basis for upholding
restrictions with respect to the preferred personalty. Although it can
be said that the enforcement of a limitation makes the limitation a
servitude running with the chattel, since the courts seldom speak in
terms of the equitable servitude doctrine can it be said that the doc-
trine is the basis for upholding the limitation? This question, unfor-
tunately, cannot be answered accurately, and to answer it in some
instances would be pure conjecture.
This brief analysis of the problems accompanying the classification
of chattels by the courts will have a profound effect upon the recogni-
tion of the equitable servitude doctrine with respect to copyrights.
Until the courts further define the nature of the doctrine, it can only
be said that the application of it to copyrights and ordinary chattels
is dependent upon both the nature of the personalty and the circum-
20 Ibid.
21 Note, 44 MARQ. L. REv. 237 (1960).
22 Barker v. Stickney, [1919] 1 K.B. 121. However, in another case concerning
copyrights, the court enjoined a publishing company from publishing a particu-
lar book when the author made a prior agreement which provided for an-
other publisher to print it. The injunction was granted on the ground that the
first publisher had an interest in the property of the copyright against third
parties. Erskine Macdonald v. Eyles, [1921], 1 Ch. 631.
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stances surrounding each situation with another contingent feature
being the kind of restriction involved.
Putting the chattel into one of the three pigeonholes also took
place in the United States, but fortunately, restrictions upon copy-
righted articles met with more approval than they did in England.
Consequently, the growth of the doctrine took different proportions.
However, like the English courts, the American courts usually held
limitations on chattels with some distain since restrictions would
fetter the free use and flow of such good.23
This inflexible attitude towards restrictions on chattels not only
permeated some courts, but it seeped into Congress as well. This
feeling is reflected in the Sherman Act 24 which forbade price re-
strictions. The passage of the Sherman Act darkened the hopes for
the usage of the doctrine for price maintenance. However, Congress
corrected their mistakes by enacting the McGuire Act2s which amended
the Sherman Act and, thereafter, the future of the doctrine became
brighter. Under the McGuire Act manufacturers and vendors were
given the right to stipulate resale prices within reasonable limits.
Violations of these price contracts were remedied by injunctive relief
With respect to ordinary chattels, the type of limitation is an
important factor in accepting or rejecting restrictive convenants. Price
maintenance restrictions now are not difficult to enforce since the
passage of the McGuire amendment. A territorial restriction was up-
held when the defendant attempted to sell an inferior quality of cigar-
ettes in the United States contrary to the terms of a contract which
had been made earlier by the plaintiff with another.2 6 The judicial atti-
tude towards use27 and tying28 restrictions was not favorable although
in New York a use restriction was upheld when a purchaser of a
machine did not comply with a limitation placed on it.2 9 The greatest
advancement the equitable servitude doctrine has had took place in
23 See infra notes 27 and 37 for cases.
24 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §1 (1958).
2566 Stat. 631 (1952), 15 U.S.C. §45(a) (3) (1958). The Sherman Act was
changed by the Miller-Tyding Amendment, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C.
§1, which validated resale price maintenance contracts in interstate commerce,
thus placing them beyond the sanctions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. In
1952, the McGuire Act specifically exempted nonsigner provisions from the
Sherman Act. The McGuire Act was held constitutional in Norman M. Morris
Corp. v. Hess Bros., Inc., 243 F.2d 274 (3d Cir. 1956).
26 p. Lorillard Co. v. Weingarden, 280 Fed. 238 (W.D.N.Y. 1922), cf., Russell
v.Tilgham, 275 Fed. 235 (E.D. Va. 1921).
27 National Skee-Ball Co. v. Seyfried, 110 N.J. Eq. 18, 158 Atl. 736 (1932) ; In re
Consolidated Factors Corp., 46 F.2d 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (restrictive sale of
stock); Garst v. Hall, 179 Mass. 588, 61 N.E. 219 (1901) and Coca Cola Co.
v. Bennett, 238 Fed. 513 (8th Cir. 1916) (trade mark restriction).
28 Motion Picture Co. v. Universal Film, 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
29 New York Bank-Note Co. v. Hamilton Bank Note Engraving & Printing Co.,
83 Hun. 593, 31 N.Y.S. 1060 (1895).
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California with the Nadell Case. The decision reflects the realistic
thinking that courts should apply when solving problems in commerce.
Not only did the court uphold a negative and an affirmative servitude,
it took cognizance of the doctrine and used it as the basis of the
decision. Although the servitudes were placed on ordinary chattels, a
study of the elements of the doctrine considered in this case will be
significant when applied to copyrighted articles.
Plaintiff purchased from a railroad company a quantity of Kraft-
brand fruit salad that had become frozen in transit. Plaintiff agreed
he would not allow the goods to enter retail outlets under the Kraft
label. Plaintiff then sold the merchandise to a wholesaler with the
restriction that the goods were to be removed from the jars and the
jars with caps and cases were to be returned to plaintiff. Subsequently,
a wholesaler sold a portion of the goods to the defendant. Although
defendant had knowledge of the restriction at the time of the sale,
he refused to comply with it and sold some of the goods in the Kraft-
jars to retailers. The trial court granted plaintiff injunctive relief
against the defendant upon the basis of broad equitable principles.
The California Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court
for plaintiff on the ground that the facts warranted an application of
the equitable servitude doctrine to chattels.
The way for the acceptance of the doctrine by the California court
had been previously prepared by earlier decisions which were analo-
gous to the doctrine both as to realty and as to personalty. In 1919"'
and later in 1940, 32 the doctrine was applied to land transactions, but
at the turn of the century it had already recognized price restrictive
agreements on chattels. 33 The fair trade laws were held constitutiona1 4
without any difficulty since price maintenance agreements had been
extended to third parties by an earlier court decision. 35 Consequently,
the recognition and application of the doctrine had been supported
both by precedent and by public policy. Due to the important role
public policy plays in the recognition of the doctrine, and since the
ground work had been previously laid, the Nadell decision fitted
squarely into the pattern set by the earlier decisions.
Moving now into the area of patented articles, although the Patent
Act3 6 of the United States is similar in wording to the English one,
the American courts took an entirely different view toward restrictions
30 Nadell & Co. v. Grasso, supra note 3.
31 Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183 Pac. 945 (1919).
32 Marra v. Aetna Construction Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 101 P. 2d 490 (1940).
33 Grogan v. Chaffee, 156 Cal. 611, 105 Pac. 745 (1909).
34 Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal. 2d 446, 55 P. 2d 117 (1936); Scovill
Manufacturing Co. v. Skaggs Pay Less Drugs, 45 Cal. 2d 881, 291 P. 2d 936
(1955).
35 D. Ghirardelli Co. v. Hunsicker, 164 Cal. 355, 128 Pac. 1041 (1912).
30 66 Stat. 792 (1952), Title 35 U.S.C. (1958).
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placed upon patented works. The statutory monopoly granted by the
patent gave the patentee only the right to prevent others from using,
making or selling that which had been patented.3 T The patent did not
give the right to make restrictive agreements, nor was this right given
by judicial interpretation of the Patent Act such as it was given in
England .3
The application of the equitable servitude doctrine to copyrighted
articles turned out to be more complex than it was to either ordinary or
patented chattels. Besides interpreting the Copyright Act, the court
must take a look at the type of chattel copyrighted and the state's
or court's attitude towards restrictions placed upon copyrighted goods.
If the restriction placed upon the article clearly was part of the
statutory monopoly granted by the Act, no problem arises because the
restriction could be enforced under the statutory grant. The complexity
of applying the equitable servitude doctrine is due to the intricacy of
questions surrounding copyrights. The first questions to be answered
are: Is the article copyrightable? Is it protected under the Copyright
Act or the common law copyright? Is the restriction placed on the
article one enforced by the Copyright Act or the common law copyright?
The final question would be: If the article is copyrighted, but the re-
striction on it is not one recognized by the Copyright Act or by the com-
mon law copyright, can the restriction be enforced by the equitable
servitude doctrine? The answer to this question will be considered in the
following material.
In answering the last question posed, consideration of the following
factors must be made: the public policy of the state or the attitude of
the court towards restrictive agreements on chattels and, more pari-
cularly, copyrighted articles; the type of restriction involved; the
effect of the doctrine of publication; the business interest of the pro-
prietor to be protected and the possible harm that would result in
enforcing the restriction; and the disclosure of the dominant and
servient tenement. The requirement of notice is a practical question and
will not be dealt with extensively. To prove the inadequacy of the
remedy at law is another factor, but in most cases it will not present
an insurmountable obstacle. Thus, it too will not be considered in
detail.
37Boston Store of Chicago v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8 (1918)
(price restriction); Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U.S. 490
(1917) (price restriction) ; Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917) (tying restriction). Powell, The Nature of a
Patent Right, 17 CoLum. L. REv. 663 (1937) ; Keasbey, Restrictive Covenants
as Applied to Territorial Rights in Patented Articles, 10 HARv. L. REV. 1
(1896). One reason for upholding restrictions placed upon statutory monopo-
lies is that the defendant will not be able to avail himself of the plaintiff's
industry and gain a "free ride." Eager, Unfair camnpetition, 46 HARV. L. REV.
1171, 1173 (1932) ; note 47 HARv. L. REv. 1419, 1424 (1934).
38 Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1912).
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The intricacy of applying the equitable servitude doctrine is due
both to the difficulty in establishing the interrelated requirements which
give rise to the doctrine and to the jurisdictional conflicts in deter-
mining the applicable law of the subject matter. It would be little
consolation to the user of the doctrine to satisfy the requisites of the
doctrine if the circumstances of the case were controlled by the law
of another area. Therefore, the first consideration is to ascertain the
law applicable to the subject matter. The first step in this direction
then is to determine whether or not the article is copyrightable. Even
if a copyright can be granted (or is granted), it must be ascertained
if the protection sought is given by the Copyright Act. If the busi-
ness interests of the copyright owner are not being shielded by the
Act, the next step is to conclude whether or not the servitude placed
on the copyrighted article is in contravention to the terms of the Act.
If no conflict arises, then the copyright owner is free to establish the
elements of the doctrine.
If in the first step mentioned above it is found that the article is
not copyrightable under the Act, the applicability of the common law
copyright must be ascertained. Likewise, it must be determined whether
protection is given under the common law copyright and whether the
servitude placed on the article conflicts with this area of the common
law. If neither the Act nor the common law copyright apply, then other
principles of the common law of the state will control the application
of the doctrine.
To reiterate, after it is concluded that the doctrine of equitable
servitude will apply, the elements of the doctrine can be established,
viz., the public, the definition of the property interest sought to be
protected (the dominant tenement), the notice of the restriction, and
the inadequacy of relief at law. Illustrations of the foregoing steps
concerning the application of the doctrine will be considered next.
PROTECTION AFFORDED UNDER THE COPYRIGHT ACT
The power to enact laws by the United States Congress concerning
copyrights is granted by the Constitution:
The Congress shall have power ... To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."
Congress has exercised this power and has added amendments to the
Copyright Act the most important amendment being passed in 1909.40
Under section l(a) 41 the proprietor of a copyright has the exclu-
sive right "To . . . copy, and vend the copyrighted work.
42
39 U.S. Const., Art. 1, Sec. 8, cl. 8.
40 35 Stat. 1075,88 (1909), Title 17 U.S.C. (1958).
4161 Stat. 652 (1947), U.S.C. §1 (a) (1958).
42 Ibid.
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With respect to copying the work of the proprietor of the copy-
right, the line of judicial decision concerning this right has encom-
passed an extremely broad area, and the use of the equitable servitude
doctrine in this area will' probably be superflous.
The owner of the copyright has the right to "vend" or transfer
the copyrighted work. However, once the right is exercised and the
goods are sold, the Act does not protect him in subsequent sales which
are at a different price.43 Therefore, price maintenance is not a right
provided by the Act even though a copyright is granted on the article.
Keeping in mind the previously mentioned form used in determining
the applicability of the equitable servitude doctrine, the next step is to
ascertain whether price maintenance contravenes any provision of the
Act. Since the Act does not specifically prohibit or limit price re-
strictions, this question is resolved, and the doctrine can be employed
to supplement the Act in this area. Establishing the requisites of the
doctrine, of course, must be considered next. Although at one time it
was considered a violation of the Sherman Act 44 to place a fixed price
restriction on a copyrighted article, the passage of a later amendment
to that Act and the passage of fair trade acts in the various states has
removed this obstacle. 4- Thus there will be room for the doctrine to
grow with respect to price maintenance. Public policy will support
price maintenance since price cutting is a form of unfair competition.
The dominant tenement would be the copyright and the servient tene-
ment would be the article itself.46 Notice can be given to subsequent
purchasers by placing the price proviso on the outside of the con-
tainer. Since non-compliance with the price restriction by subsequent
purchasers would cause irreparable damage to the plaintiff, which
damage would not be adequately compensated at law, equitable relief
can be invoked.4 7 Thus, the doctrine can apply under section 1(a);
the doctrine is not only pertinent in its applicability, but it can also
be established without difficulty.
Section l(b), clause 548 provides, "To complete, execute, and
finish it if it be a model or design for a work of art. . . ." The Judicial
interpretation of this clause is that the author or designer does not
have an exclusive right to manufacture the article described in the
certificate of copyright registration. It was felt that to give such an
43 Bobbs-Merril v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
44 Straus v. American Publisher's Ass'n. 231 U.S. 222 (1913) ; Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. John D. Parks & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); Annot., 7 A.L.R. 449
(1920); Annot., 19 A.L.R. 925 (1922); Annot., 32 A.L.R. 1087 (1924); Annot.,
103 A.L.R. 1331 (1936); Annot., 125 A.L.R. 1335 (1940); Annot., 64 A.L.R.
2d 758 (1959).
45 Supra note 25.
46 Supra note 10.
47 POMEPROY, supra note 14.
4861 Stat. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. §1 (b) (1958).
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exclusive right would "unjustly create a monopoly and moreover
would usurp the functions of letters patent. '49 Consequently, a copy-
right can be granted only to complete the design on a garment, but
it will be ineffective against pattern and design pirates after the
garment is manufactured and distributed to the public for sale.
Reliance upon common law copyright for protection in this area
would be of no avail since the manufacturing of the garment with
the design desired to be guarded against piracy would be a publica-
tion of the very design itself. And the sale of the garment to the
general public would cease any common law copyright in the design.50
Although it would seem that this form of piracy would fall under
the purview of the law prohibiting unfair competition, protection
afforded under this area of the law cannot ordinarily be successfully
invoked.5'
The unfortunate result of these decisions is that there is a piracy
of styles and designs in many important industries, particularly in the
ladies garment industry.52
Although the Adelman 3 decision stated that to grant a copyright
on a design would usurp the patent field, a patent is not available to
the designer because his design is not an "invention" and also it has
only seasonal value in commerce.54 Thus, the Patent Act will offer no
protection to the designer.
Consequently, the existing law is void of protection. Since copy-
rights, (statutory or common law), patents and principles of unfair
competition do not cover designs, reliance must be placed on another
phase of the common law of the state. An examination of the equit-
able servitude doctrine shows that it has great possibilities to give the
desired protection to the garment industry. Public policy, the most
difficult factor to establish, would be based upon the protection of
the property interest that the designer has in his design. This right
should be protected ". . . even at the risk of 'restricting and hampering
manufacture and trade' in such type of business." 55 Thus, the evils of
design stealing should more than off-set the fettering of the designs
by restrictive covenants. The dominant tenement would be that right
of the designer in his design which would be guarded by a covenant
prohibiting others from copying it. The servient tenement and notice
49Adelman v. Sonner, 21 U.S.P.Q. 218 (1934) and Kemp & Beatley v. Hirsch,
2 U.S.P.Q. 259 (1929) cited in HOWELL, THE COPYRIGHT LAW, 124 (1942).
For a discussion of the difficulties in getting a patent on designs, see note
72 HARV. L. REv. 1520 (1959).
50 Fashions Originators Guild of America, Inc v. Federal Trade Commission,
114 F.2d 80 (2d Cir., 1940), aff'd, 48 U.S.P.Q. 483 (1940).
5' Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929).
52 Margolis v. National Bellas Hess Co., Inc., 249 N.Y.S. 175 (1941).
53 Supra note 49.
54 HOWELL, supra note 49 at 125.
55 Ibid.
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usually offer no problems since the servient tenement is that object
which bears the servitude while the notice requirements can be satisfied
by putting the terms of the servitude on a sticker on the outside of
the garment and on the label in the inside of the garment. Money
damages against a stealer of the design would not be adequate relief
alone, but injunctive relief given in equity would be a better remedy
to protect the designer from future piracy. In conclusion, the doctrine
of equitable servitudes does seem to offer refuge to the clothing in-
dustry, particularly the pattern and design aspect of it.
Oftentimes the author will assign or license his work for drama-
tization purposes. Yet the author will desire to maintain some control
over his work in order to prevent undesirable changes in plot or in
characters. Or perhaps, he might wish to have the assignee or licensee
make additions or deletions, which changes would contribute to a more
artistic dramatization. The right which the author ultimately wishes
to retain is the right to have changes made by the assignee or licensee
only with his consent. These controls are usually incorporated in the
contract and the courts look to the contract to determine the rights
and obligations of both parties. If there be no contract between the
author and the assignee or licensee which controls the right to elaborate
on the literary work, the author is still not without some protection.",
And now as to what is acquired when one procures the right
to elaborate upon an original story. . . . I take it that, while
scenery, action, and characters may be added to an original story,
and even supplant subordinate portions thereof, there is an
obligation upon the elaborator to retain and give appropriate
expression to the theme, thought, and main action of that which
was originally written. The unqualified grant of this right is, I
should say, fraught with danger to a writer of standing, particu-
larly when he inserts no provision for his approval of such
elaboration as may be made .... Nevertheless, elaboration of a
story means something other than that the same should be dis-
carded, and its title and authorship applied to a wholly dissimilar
tale.57
This secondary or incidental right of the Copyright Act is extremely
broad when construed for the assignee or licensee. The author, how-
ever, might wish to stipulate precise changes or additions if the story
is to be transformed into a play. The importance of this control over
the work after it has left the author's hand is felt in the motion pic-
ture, radio and television industries.5 s Due to the recognition of con-
trols over copyrighted works and their purposes of protecting the
author from undesirable deviations, the doctrine of equitable servitudes,
if used to place restrictions on the work, should be readily accepted
56 Curwood v. Affiliated Distributors, Inc., 283 Fed. 219 (1922).
57Ibid.58 HowELL, supra note 49 at 139.
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by the courts. The doctrine has decided advantages over the contract
device in maintaining control over the dramatization of the work by
an assignee. One of the advantages is that the right which exists in
equitable servitudes is a right in rem whereas in sub-contracts there
exists only a right in personam.59 Since the equitable servitude follows
the literary work itself, there is no necessity to enter into sub-contracts
with future assignees to maintain the rights granted under the first
contract. The continuance of a restriction by means of sub-contracts
become burdensome when third parties are reluctant to accept them
or when they are hesitant to continue the restriction by means of
further assignments. Thus when an author enters into a contract to
have his work dramatized, the use of the equitable servitude doctrine
will avoid the cumbersome practice of sub-contracts. 60
One of the rights given by the Act is the exclusive right to public-
ally perform the work for profit.'1 Whether it is recorded or live, the
playing of the composition over the air has been held to constitute a
public performance for profit which infringes the copyright if per-
mission is not obtained from the proprietor. Hence, the composer has
a remedy against one who would publically perform his musical work.
Another right given by the Act is the exclusive right to "copy"
his own work.6 2 Yet in White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo, 6 3 the
Supreme Court stated that a piano roll was not a copy of the work
within the meaning of the Act and that therefore the proprietor of
the copyright could not restrain the manufacturer from making and
selling rolls which embodied the copyrighted material. Needless to
say, this decision left the composer in an unfavorable position since
he could neither prevent nor profit from the sale of recorded rendi-
tions of his copyrighted work.64 Congress felt the inequities of this
decision and amended the Act in 190965 to afford protection to the
composer. The amendment provides for an exclusive right in the
proprietor to mechanically reproduce his composition. But on the other
hand, the amendment contains a "compulsory licensing provision" or
"accessibility clause" which provides that if the proprietor licenses
the recording rights to a manufacturer, any other manufacturer can
then record the composition by paying a certain sum to the proprietor.
66
The sum: Two cents for each record manufactured. The result:
Reputable manufacturers disregard this section and deal directly with
59 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, §429 at 198 (5th ed. 1941).
60 CHAFFEE, supra note 8.
6161 Stat. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. §1 (e) (1958).
6261 Stat. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. §1(a) (1958).
63 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
64Todamerica Musica v. R.C.A., 171 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1948).
6535 Stat. 1075 (1909), 17 U.S.C. §1 (e) (1958).
66 Ibid.
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the publisher; Disreputable "disk-leggers" or -pirates ignore it because
of the inadequate damages provided by the Act.67
Despite the inadequacy of relief afforded by the Act, it is doubtful
if the equitable servitude doctrine can be applied to remedy the situa-
tion. A restriction placed on each record which forbids anyone to copy
it without the proprietor's consent would be in direct contravention
to the Act. Or, a restriction which would make the "royalties" greater
(even to a reasonable amount) would seemingly run afoul of the Act
and therefore would not be enforced by the courts.
It must be noted, however, that the right to copy records on the
condition that the copier pays the two cents does not include the right
to play those records in public for profit.68 The playing of records in
public against the stipulation on the label that the records are for
private use only will be considered in the following material.
THE DOCTRINE AND COMMON LAW COPYRIGHT
The application of the equitable servitude doctrine to articles copy-
rightable under the Act had been considered. The use of the doctrine
in the area of common law copyright presents different problems. The
greatest obstacle to overcome other than public policy is the doctrine
of publication. Under this doctrine the owner of a common law copy-
right loses his interest in the copyright when the work is published
for public use.69 Since the equitable servitude doctrine is contingent
upon the existence of the copyright, be it under the Act or by a common
law right, the loss of the copyright would involve the virtual loss of
the dominant tenement.
The protection afforded by the common law copyright to the artist
which prohibited any unauthorized copying or using of his work was
considered perpetual and was first recognized in an 18th century
English decision.70 Shortly after this decision, it was held that a statute
abrogated this perpetual attribute and unless the property interest was
covered by the statute,7'1 publication of the work by the artist termi-
nated the copyright . 2 Common law copyright was recognized in the
United States7 3 and the doctrine that publication by the artist resulted
68 Note, 5 Stan. L. Rev. 433, 441 (1953); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248
F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1957) held that the damage provisions of §101(b) are not
applicable to the infringement of a musical copyright by mechanical repro-
duction. Such infringements were held to be governed exclusively by §101 (e)
which sets damages at two cents per record plus a discretionary allowance
not to exceed three times that amount. However, court costs and attorney fees
are recoverable. The home dubber who records music with his own tape
recorder need only pay 8 cents: royalty, 2 cents; treble damages, 6 cents.
Note, 5 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 663 (1958).
68 Berlin v. Daigle & Russo, 31 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1929).
69 Nimmer, Copyright Publication, 56 CoLum. L. Rxv. 185 (1956).
70 Miller v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769).
718 Anne, c. 19 (1709).
72 Donaldson v. Beckett, 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (K.B. 1774).
73 Press Publishing Co. v. Monroe, 73 Fed. 196 (2d Cir. 1896) ; Baker v. Libbie,
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in the loss of his copyright interest was also recognized.7" However,
tracing the history of the doctrine of publication in the United States
reveals that it might give way to a more realistic approach. Conse-
quently, the application of this doctrine which results in the loss of
the common law copyright might not prove to be an obstacle in the
path of the equitable servitude doctrine. A review of use restrictions
placed upon records by a performer illustrates this point.
Since the Act only protects the rights of the composer and pub-
lisher,75 the performer is without statutory shelter. Although the
performer can copyright a musical arrangement as a "new work"'76
after he has permission of the composer, the arrangement, to be copy-
rightable, must be so distinct from the original composition "that any
person hearing it played would become aware of the distinctiveness
of the arrangement. ' ' 77 These judicial restraints have hampered the
effectiveness of the provision. If the records themselves could be
copyrighted the problem would be solved, but this right has not been
given.7 8 Even if records could be copyrighted, it is contended that the
disadvantages attached to the procedure of copyrighting would outweigh
the advantages gained by the performer.7 9
In order to meet this problem, Fred Waring formed the National
Association of Performing Artists. 0 After Waring's orchestra had
made records, he had inscribed on the legend, "Not licensed for radio
broadcast." '8 1 Despite this inscription, a radio station purchased records
and used them for broadcast purposes. To compel the station to stop
playing his records over the air, Waring sued for injunction. Presented
with this issue, the court pointed out that a rendition was "not the
subject of protection under existing copyright laws. 8s2 However, the
court felt that Waring had a common law right in his orchestra's
rendition. Justice Stern writing for the majority met the question of
the doctrine of publication by quoting from an earlier decision which
stated that the restriction placed on the record limited the publication
210 Mass. 599, 97 N.E. 109 (1912); The New Jersey Staten Dental Society
v. The Dentacura Co., 57 N.J.Eq. 593, 41 At. 672 (1898).
74 See cases cited in supra note 73.
75 Note, 5 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 663, 666.
76 35 Stat. 1077 (1909), 17 U.S.C. §7 (1958).
77 Supreme Records v. Decca Records, 90 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
78 Kaplan, Publication in Copyright Law: The Question of Phonograph Records,
103 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (1955) ; Boss, Interpretive Rights of Performing
Artists, 42 DICK. L. REV. 57 (1938).
7 Countryman, The Organized Musicians: II, 16 U. CH. L. REv. 239, 259 (1949);
Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: II, 45 COLU. L. REv. 719, 735(1945).80 Warner, Radio and Television Rights 952-53 (1953).
sl Waring v. WDAS, 327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631 (1937). See also, notes, 22 MINN. L.
Ray. 559 (1938) ; 18 B.U. L. REV. 441 (1938) and 42 Dick. L. Rev. 88 (1938) for
a discussion of the case.
82 Id. at 633.
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and the common law right was not lost.83 Thus, it follows from this
decision at least that the doctrine of publication is contingent upon
whether there is a restriction placed on the article rather than whether
the publication destroys the restriction. Therefore, it is doubtful if he
had found the application of the doctrine of publication he would still
have struck dowrq the use restriction:
Where public policy or some other determinative considera-
tion is not involved, why should the law adopt an immutable
principle that no restrictions, reservations, or limitations can
ever be allowed to accompany the sale of an article of personal
property .... 84
Although Justice Stern did not speak in terms of the dominant
tenement, he did define two property interests upon which the tene-
ment could have attached. The Justice not only found a common law
property right in the rendition but he found that the principles of
"unfair competition" defined another property right--"the commer-
cial value of the orchestra's performance."'8 5 Thus, there would not
have been any difficulty in determining the dominant tenement.
The recognition of the equitable servitude doctrine in this area
by the Waring decision, however, was soon disregarded by Judge
Hand when he was confronted with a similar situation.8 6 Speaking
for the court, Learned Hand stated:
We think that the "common-law" in these performances
ended with the sale of the records and that the restriction did
not save it; and that if it did, the records themselves could not
be clogged with a servitude.8 7
The Whiteman. Case has not withstood the test of time and the
necessity of practicality. The result of Judge Hand's reasoning was
to allow record piracy to remain unhindered. Fifteen years after the
Whiteman decision the Second Circuit reversed its ground and allowed
a manufacturer to restrain another manufacturer from marketing rec-
ords which embodied a performing right which belonged to the first
manufacturer.88 The new policy towards restrictions placed on records
was explained by District Judge Dimock as follows:
We believe that the inescapable result ... is that where the
originator, or the assignee of the originator, of records of per-
formances by musical artists puts those records on public sale,
83 American Tobacco Co. v. Werkmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907).84 Waring v. WDAS, supra note 81, at 637.
85 Id. at 641.
86 R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 712 (1940).
87Id. at 88.88 Capitol Records v. MUercury Records, 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955); note, 31
N.Y.U. L. REv. 415 (1956).
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his act does not constitute a dedication of the right to copy and
sell the records. 89
Thus, the application of the doctrine of publication formerly re-
sulted in the loss of the common law property right, and servitudes on
the chattel did not prevent the doctrine from operating. However, the
publication doctrine has been judicially whittled away to the extent
that it now will probably not hinder the application of the equitable
servitude doctrine.
Such artistic productions as news90 or cartoons9 although em-
bodying intellectual qualities still do not come under the purview of
the Act. With respect to a news-story, the principles which prohibit
unfair competition have defined a "quasi" property interest in them.92
Therefore, the user of the equitable servitude would find no difficulty
in supporting restrictions placed on a news-story or cartoon since
there exists an interest to which the dominant tenement would attach.
Restrictions placed on such a work would not be against public policy
because to copy a news-story or to broadcast it over the air without
the owner or association's consent would be a form of unfair competi-
tion. Justice Pitney made this point clear:
Although the literary quality of reporting news is copy-
rightable, the "news element-the information respecting current
events contained in the literary production-is not the creation
of the writer, but is a report of matters that ordinarily are publici
juris. . . . It is not to be supposed that the framers of the
Constitution, when they empowered Congress 'to promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their re-
spective writings and discoveries' . . . intended to confer upon
one who might happen to be the first to report a historic event
the exclusive right for any period to spread the knowledge of it."
The right that the association [International News Service]
has is a quasi-property right which warrants protection in the
assembled news itself.93
In Associated Press v. KVOS,9 4 a similar problem arose. The
defendant radio station was enjoined from broadcasting news taken
from newspapers which were recipients of plaintiff's service. Since
they were competing against each other in the collection and com-
munication of news, such a taking by the radio station was considered
unfair competition.
89 Id. at 663.
90 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) ; Nimnier,
supra note 74 at 193.
91 Fisher v. Star, 231 N.Y. 414, 132 N.E. 133 (1921).92 International News Service v. Associated Press, supra note 95, at 237 and
Associated Press v. KVOS, 80 F.2d 575, 579 (9th Cir. 1935).
9 International News Service v. Associated Press, Supra note 90, at 234.
94 Associated Press v. KVOS, supra note 92.
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Therefore, if the news' serivice has the right to absolutely enjoin
others from pirating his service, it would seem thai he has the right
to place certain conditions on the use of his service. Such a use
restriction could be easily enforced through the employment of the
equitable servitude doctrine. Thi requisites of the doctrine can be
established by showing that non-compliance with the restriction is piracy
and that the dominant tenement is that "quasi" property right de-
fined in the laws prohibiting unfair competition.
THE USE OF THE DOCTRINE BY TniRm PARTIES
The growth of the doctrine will not only affect the substantive
rights of an owner of a copyright under the Act or at common law,
but third parties who deal in copyrighted articles can conceivably
share in the benefits afforded by the doctrine. As the facts of the
Nadell Case95 bring out, the servitude which was placed upon the
Kraft-brand fruit salad was not put there by the Kraft Company.
Instead, a railroad company which sought to protect the good will of
the Kraft Company formulated the negative and affirmative servitudes.
Although it cannot be said'that the railroad company did not benefit
from the servitudes, the Kraft Company received the direct benefits
as if it were a third party beneficiary. Thus, in order to enter into a
restrictive agreement and apply the equitable servitude doctrine, the
initiating party does not have to be protecting a property interest of
his own, but he can protect a property interest of another.
Unlike the proprietor or the performer, the manufacturer of
copyrighted articles is not protected by the Copyright Act.9 8 The rights
that he has with respect to copyrighted articles are those generally
derived by the succession of rights from the artist through contract.97
Due to the adaptibility of the equitable servitude device, the manu-
facturers could employ it to place restriction upon the copyrighted
goods that he manufactures. Since the servitude runs with the chattel
it will be enforced against third persons who have notice.98
Distributors or carriers (as in the Nadell Case) could also parti-
cipate in the use of the doctrine to protect artistic works. For example,
if a quantity of records had become slightly defective through storagd
or shipment, the distributor or the carrier would not want to have
the records sold to the public under a representation that the records
were in perfect condition. To do so would destroy the good will of
the record manufacturer and the reputation of the recording artist.
Thus, the distributor or carrier would desire to have the records gold
95 Madell & Co. v. Grasso, supra note 3.
96 Capitol Records v. Mercury Records, supra note 88.
97 The Manufacturer, however, might contribute some technical quality to the
copyright articles and would then,' 6f course, be protected by the Act. Contra,
R.C.A. v. Whiteman, supra note 86.
98 Note 5 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 663, 670 (1958).
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only if the public was informed of their defective condition. To give
notice to the public that the records were defective would be a servi-
tude with which the retailer must comply. This servitude could be
enforced by means of the equitable servitude doctrine. Undoubtedly,
the distributor or the carrier sold the records at a price which was
lower than the price the records were originally worth. If the retailer
were to sell them at the original price, inequities would result thereby.
These price inequities would be another factor in the recognition of
the equitable servitude doctrine.
RECOGNITION OF THE DOCTRINE BY THE STATE COURTS
Cases concerning artistic property and the doctrine of equitable
servitudes will be decided upon state law under the theory of Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 9
Since the Copyright Act does not deal with the protection
of phonograph records of the performances of public-domain
compositions by virtuosos, [and since] we have no basis for
applying federal law [state law will have to apply] .1o
Since the growth of the doctrine is dependent upon the attitude
of each state towards restrictions placed upon chattels, a review of
the decisions of a state will be necessary in order to determine
whether the doctrine will be recognized by the particular state. How-
ever, not every state has had the opportunity to express its public
policy concerning servitudes on chattels, nor has each state been pre-
sented the opportunity to make a decision with respect to the equitable
servitude doctrine. Yet, price restrictions placed upon chattels under
the fair trade laws of a state are considered a servitude. Although
not all states have adopted fair trade laws,1 ' among those states that
have them there exists a difference of opinion as to the constitutionality
of price restrictions against third parties or commonly called non-
signors."°2 A factor in predicting whether a court will recognize the
application of the equitable servitude doctrine to chattels and then to
copyrighted articles is whether the court has previously upheld the
constitutionality of price fixing agreements against nonsignors. For
99 Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1937).100 Capitol Records v. Mercury Records, supra note 88, at 662.
101 The states that do not have fair trade laws: Alaska, Missouri, Nebraska,
Texas and Vermont. The states that have passed fair trade laws, but do not
have rulings concerning their constitutionality as to nonsigners: Alabama,
Idaho, Maine, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia and
Wyoming. CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 593003 and 10,000.
102 The states that have upheld the constitutionality of the fair trade laws as to
nonsigners: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota and Wis-
consin. The states that have rejected the nonsigner clause as being uncon-
stitutional: Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
Louisiana has held the fair trade laws unconstitutional in part. Ibid.
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example, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Dr. G. H. Tichenor Anti-
septic v. Schwegmann Brothers Giant Super Markets'0 3 declared that
the extension of the fair trade laws to include nonsignors was un-
constitutional because it was against the public policy of the state:
Equitable Servitudes running with a movable and restraints
on the alienation of movable property are disfavored under
the public policy of this State. Once a movable is sold, the seller
relinquishes all interest therein and conditional sales whereby
the vendor retains title to the property, are not recognized in
Louisiana.10 4
To contrast the Louisiana position California, which was the first
state to adopt the fair trade laws and further upheld their constitu-
tionality against nonsignors, recognized without difficulty the docrtine
of equitable servitudes applied to chattels. 05
Since the recognition of the doctrine would vary from state to
state, the use of it to supplement the Copyright Act would not be
nationally uniform. One of the purposes of the Act was for uniformity
of protection to the copyright proprietor. Consequently, there will be
a conflict between the federal and state jurisdictions. Yet, this dicotomy
of protection, no matter how unfortunate it seems to be, is due to the
relationship of federal and state law itself. The passage of the Copy-
right Act did not exclude the states from rendering protection to
artistic productions:
... to construe a constitutional grant of power to Congress
as excluding the exercise of state power in the area of the grant
is contrary to the traditional canons of constitutional construc-
tion. Further, the broad purpose of the clause, to encourage
progress in science and the arts, seems to require allowance of
state participation in the protection of writings .... The progress
envisioned by the copyright clause would hardly be promoted
if new kinds of literary and artistic property could not be pro-
tected by state law, at least until Congress dealt with the new
problems of protection.1
0 6
Although it must be contended that it would be more desirable to
have uniformity in regard to the protection given the product of the
artist, such uniformity is not always the predominate issue.0 7
CONCLUSION
It must be noted that there are many variables which will affect
the growth of the doctrine in the area of copyrighted articles. The
103 231 La. 51, 90 So. 2d 343 (1956).
104 Id. at 350.
105 Nadell & Co. v. Grasso, supra note 3.
106 Kalodner & Vance, The Relationship Between Federal and State Protection
of Literary and Artistic Property, 72 HaRv. L. REv. 1079, 1082 (1959).
'107Id. at 1085. See also note 26 Ia. L. Rev. 384 (1941) ; "[P]rotection, if it is
to come at all without legislation, must come from the common law." Id. at
388.
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most influential variable would be a change in the Copyright Act
itself which would give greater protection to the copyright owner.
Such an amendment would be more reliable in guarding the copy-
right proprietor's rights than would the doctrine. Consequently, the
equitable device to enforce restrictions on chattels would then be
employed only to a limited extent.
The vacuum created by the inadequate protection afforded under
the present Copyright Act, however, has caused a search for legal
methods to fill the gap. The doctrine, although only recognized
sporadically, is the most flexible device available. The remedies granted
under the doctrine alone place it in a most enviable position among
other legal methods. Because it is part of the equity jurisdiction of
the court, both injunctions and specific performance can be granted
to give relief.
Further clarification of the doctrine by judicial application will
make it a more effective and a more reliable source of protection to
the creator, manufacturer, distributor and carrier of artistic property.
Should the present proclivity towards the recognition of the doctrine-
continue, there is a possibility that it will take its place as an integral
part of personal property law. Should this evolution of the doctrine
come about, artistic innovators need not fear that their contributions
to the world will be pirated due to the inadequate protection of the
present Copyright Act.
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